Developing an effective nuclear security culture requires the adaptation of different attitudes and behaviours. By providing training, performance tests, and by employing the incentives and disincentives at their disposal, managers should be able to establish appropriate patterns of behaviour to facilitate a satisfactory security culture.

That said, security measures might potentially be seen as an obstacle, and the incentive to avoid or disregard certain security measures can be strong. It is not enough for employees to be aware of and able to take the necessary security actions; they have to be motivated to do so.

As an example from an anonymous US facility , the director made it a practice to ensure that whenever there was a security violation, there were consequences for the team responsible and all of those above them (including the director). Conversely, when a team had gone for an extended period with no security violations, the director made sure to reward their team (see Bunn 2005: 2).

F urther Reading:

Bunn, M., ‘Incentives for Nuclear Security.’, Proceedings of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 46th Annual Meeting. Phoenix, AZ: INMM, 2005

Bunn, M. and Sagan, S. D., A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes, Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2014