Highly sophisticated technology alone is not sufficient to eliminate threats to nuclear materials and information, and the improvement of physical protection measures and technology should not inhibit the development of an effective security culture.

An incident that took place in the mid-2000s at a Russian nuclear institute illustrates how strong physical protection measures can lead to complacency (see Bunn and Sagan 2014: 11). The facility had two portal monitors in place, an American model and a Russian model, in a hallway leading to a vault holding weapons-grade nuclear materials. The American model was more sensitive, and would set off an alarm on Thursdays when the building next door generated a large amount of radiation through the creation of medical isotopes. Therefore, the American portal monitor was routinely turned off on Thursdays, and the Russian monitor was used instead. Everyone at the facility was aware of this practice, meaning that the American portal monitor was regularly deactivated – and also that Thursdays were the perfect day to plan a theft or other security breach.

This type of complacency can be avoided by building a strong nuclear security culture. Culture is largely dependent on the behaviour of people, which affects the way in which they perceive and use equipment. All employees should be encouraged to take security seriously and accept personal responsibility, as opposed to relying only on equipment or dedicated security guards.

Further Reading:

Bunn, M. and Sagan, S. D., . A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2014