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Security incidents at sites holding nuclear and radiological material are more widespread than is commonly realised. Recorded incidents range from minor perimeter breaches and the theft of sensitive information and materials to armed attacks. The non-state actors responsible for such incidents include environmentalists who oppose nuclear energy, insiders with financial, personal or ideological motivations, and anti-establishment groups who see nuclear and radiological sites as symbols of state power which they oppose.
At the governmental level the issues of nuclear and radiological terrorism tend to dominate current threat perceptions. As outlined by Ferguson and Potter, nuclear terrorism is generally considered to comprise four catastrophic scenarios: the theft and detonation of a nuclear weapon from a state arsenal; the development and detonation of an improvised nuclear device; an attack or sabotage on a nuclear installation with the intent of releasing radiation; and the construction and use of a radiological weapon. These scenarios range considerably in terms of their likelihood and potential impact.
In fact, documented threats to nuclear and radiological material encompass a far broader range of actors and actions than the scenarios outlined by Ferguson and Potter, including sabotage and the theft of material and/or sensitive information. Once material is outside of regulatory control it can be used for malicious intent; and numerous incidents where radiological materials have been used for nefarious purposes have been recorded.
According to the IAEA, the belief that a credible threat exists and consequently that nuclear security is important forms the ‘foundation of nuclear security culture’ and ‘ultimately influences the effectiveness of nuclear security’ measures.
Further Reading:
Ferguson, C. D. and Potter, W. C., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, New York: Routledge, 2005
