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Technology can support nuclear safety and nuclear security systems, but is only effective as the broader measures adopted by the operator. Technological solutions may also be undermined by numerous issues, including:
• poor training or incorrect use;
• poor maintenance;
• poor system design (i.e. it can be circumvented);
• poor supporting processes (i.e. following-up alarms etc.);
• human error (accidental); and
• human error (sabotage).
Moreover, technological solutions may be expensive investments, both in terms of initial purchases and through-life costs, while a fixation on technological systems themselves may lead to the neglect of other elements of an effective security culture.
There are many potential points of failure in any security system. Therefore, technology is best viewed and designed around multiple and overlapping strands that contribute to a site’s overall security. These strands also include good security policies and procedures, effective leadership and an observant and questioning workplace where security culture is valued.
As such, technological solutions offer a partial solution to security vulnerabilities, but in turn they need to be underpinned by the effective use and maintenance of technical solutions, as well as the wider nuclear security approaches.
An over-reliance on technology is evident in the break-in at the US Y-12 National Security Complex, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee in 2012. The Y-12 National Security Complex was once described as the ‘Fort Knox of nuclear facilities’, in reference to the seemingly insurmountable levels of security at the site. However, in July 2012 three elderly protestors broke into the Y-12 facility. Using ordinary bolt cutters, the three protestors cut through three layers of fencing and gained access to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) and within 20 feet of nuclear material.
Genuine alarms were dismissed as false alarms, due to the high number of alarms that were set off on a regular basis at the site. The protesters remained at the HEUMF for at least half an hour and were able to pray, daub peace slogans, and sing religious songs. One protestor also brought along a small hammer and used it to hit a corner of the building, knocking off an approximately 30cm piece of concrete. Although security was later called, hammering was initially mistaken a maintenance crew banging on the walls.
In the ensuing investigation, one of the issues identified was a complacent work culture that relied too heavily on technology, which in turn was poorly maintained and incorrectly used.
Each individual element that forms part of a site’s security system may have flaws and it is important to have multiple and overlapping technologies and systems. As noted by Matthew Bunn and Scott Sagan (2014), ‘security managers should never have too much faith in any one element of their security system. Seals can be defeated, portal monitors can be defeated or gone around, guards can fail to search employees, employee reporting systems can fail to detect suspicious behavior. But with a system that genuinely offers defense in depth, it can be made very difficult for an insider adversary to overcome all the layers in the system’.
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