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Given the general trade-off between cost, security, convenience and intellectual freedom, it is highly unlikely that any one facility will be able to protect against all possible threats while maintaining an operational workplace.
However, adopting a risk management approach to security can minimise the most likely threats. According to the IAEA, when designing nuclear security systems and/or measures for nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, system designers should follow four steps to address the threats:
• The identification of threats;
• The identification and assessment of targets and consequences;
• The assessment of threats and risks; and
• The use of a risk-informed approach to prioritise nuclear security systems and measures.
Identification of threats includes measures such as assessing the vulnerability of nuclear and other radioactive material under regulatory control; the availability of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control; security measures taken for transboundary movements; and analysis of adversary capability and intent.
Within each facility, the IAEA recommends that site management should also identify and assess potential targets and understand the potential consequences of theft or release from those sites.
The two parts may then be used to assess the severity of risk using a standardised threat and risk assessment methodology. This then helps inform an action plan wherein areas facing the highest risk should be prioritised.
The four steps outlined by the IAEA assumes that the main risk faced by nuclear and radiological sites are external. Given the potential for insider threats, these approaches should be complemented by multiple layers of security and an effective security culture that increase the possibility of risk of detection and may deter malicious actors.
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