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“An adversarial relationship between the regulator and operator is necessary for ensuring effective nuclear security.”
Do you agree with this statement?
How should the relationship between the nuclear security regulator and operator be managed?

Good organisational practice emphasises the need for regulatory independence, and the separation of regulatory responsibilities and promotional responsibilities within government. Indeed, the IAEA notes that ‘experience has proven that safety and credibility are best served by institutionally separating the enabling and regulatory aspects of nuclear power’, while the effective separation between regulatory bodies and organisations concerned with the promotion or use of nuclear energy is required by key IAEA documents and agreements, such as in the Convention on Nuclear Safety. This separation is designed to help prevent conflicts of interest within government, and ensure regulator independence.

Another concern is ‘regulatory capture’, wherein companies in regulated industries may unduly influence the formulation and enforcement of regulations, leading to lower levels of effective oversight. Regulatory capture can have severe adverse consequences on the effective regulation of an industry. Indeed, this was cited as a key factor in the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster by the official report of the Japanese Diet (Parliament). Similar concerns about regulatory capture have been expressed in the US, where after a series of incidents – such as the 2007 shutdown at Byron nuclear power plant – the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been accused of being too close to the nuclear power industry.

Although the prospect of regulatory capture remains a persistent concern (particularly in countries with a relatively small expert population), the effective separation of roles does not need to be adversarial. A cooperative working relationship between licensees and regulators can enable fuller understanding of regulatory requirements and better communication between parties. Moreover, increased understanding and trust can lead to the early spotting of potential issues, stopping them from developing into more complex and costly issues.

In contrast, an adversarial relationship may incentivise the ‘covering up’ of nuclear safety or security issues, or lead to costly legal battles, as it did in Japan before 2011. However, organisations should take steps to ensure professional distance is maintained, such as regulators not accepting gifts from licensees, while states may consider imposing exclusion periods which prevent employees moving directly between the regulatory or operating sectors.


Further Reading:

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Facing Safety and Security Challenges, Vienna, 2006

Stoiber, C., Baer, A., Pelzer, N., and Tonhauser, W., Handbook on Nuclear Law, Vienna, 2003

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1 (Rev. 1), Vienna, 2015

Zeller, T., ‘Nuclear Agency Is Criticized as Too Close to Its Industry’, The New York Times, 7 May 2011

Knickmeyer, E., ‘Nuclear industry has been pushing for less oversight, and it’s working’ , The LA Times. 17 July 2019

Kaufmann, D. and Penciakova, V., Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: Assessing Regulatory Failure in Japan and the United States, Brookings Institute, 1 April 2011

Independent Investigation Commission, The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Executive summary, The National Diet of Japan, Tokyo, 2012