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Although there is no universal definition of an insider, there are several widely recognised characteristics that are intrinsic to insiders versus external adversaries. According to the IAEA, an insider in the nuclear context is ‘an adversary with authorised access to a nuclear facility, transport operation or sensitive information’.
Insiders can take advantage of this access (which can be both physical and electronic), as well as their authority (for instance, being in a position of respect or being able to enforce obedience) and knowledge (familiarity with an organisation, its sensitive assets and procedures), to bypass nuclear security measures and conduct malicious acts, such as theft or sabotage.
Empirical cross-industry studies have identified a wide range of motivations that have driven insider actions, the most common of these being financial. For example, there exist cases where nuclear materials have been for stolen in an effort to extract financial gain, either via sale to a third party or through extortion. Insiders can also be motivated by a variety of reasons – including ideological (e.g. anti-nuclear, terrorism etc.), personal (revenge, disgruntlement etc.) or psychological such as mental health issues. Insiders can also act due to coercion, for examples in scenarios where they or their family is threatened by a third party.
Insiders pose arguably the greatest threat to nuclear and other industries, due to characteristics outlined above. They also have the ability to: identify specific vulnerabilities; select an optimum time to act; extend their actions over an extended period; and try again if initially unsuccessful.
Further Reading:
Quinn, E.A., ‘Insider threat - NRC's perspective’, Nuclear Materials Management, V.12: pp. 85-86, 1983
