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“Pre-employment screening is the most effective method for mitigating the risk posed by insiders.”
Do you agree with this statement?
What other security measures can be put in place to counter the insider threat?

Pre-employment screening or ‘vetting’ is a key aspect of most organisations’ approach to mitigating or preventing the risk posed by insiders. Although its use may vary from country to country, the IAEA has published detailed guidance on pre-employment screening.

It is possible to exclude potential insiders by identifying undesirable behaviour or characteristics, which may indicate motivation – either prior to allowing them access to the site or upon evaluation after they have already gained access (vetting and ongoing aftercare).

Detection of malicious acts by insiders relies on communication, observation and surveillance. Every employee and contractor at the facility should be prepared to detect a malicious act, and they should be trained to react appropriately to protect themselves and the facility.

Pre-employment screening should ensure that organisations are employing individuals entitled to work in the respective territory, and with the right training, skills, background and experience. This should include the values necessary for employment in the nuclear sector. Screening commonly involves an identity and criminal background check, and evaluation of clearances.

It is recommended to take a ‘graded approach’ depending on job description, as different clearance levels may apply. For example, some but not all candidates should also undergo a counter-terrorism check and review of personal finances. They might also provide detailed educational background and address history; and be able to back this information up with personal references.

The majority of insider acts occur 6-10 years after starting employment, i.e. they would likely be missed by pre-employment screening. Therefore, additional measures to mitigate the risk posed by insiders include continuing behavioural observation and testing once employed, as well as limiting individuals’ access, authority and knowledge when it comes to both physical areas and information systems. Particularly sensitive industries may also include certain oversight mechanisms and restrictions following the cessation of employment.


Further Reading:

UK Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), Pre-Employment Screening and National Security Vetting, website of ONR, November 2019

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), CPNI Insider Data Collection Study: Report of Main Findings, 2013

Chapman, G., Hobbs, C., Homan, Z. S., Mahlouly, D., Salisbury, D. and Tzinieris, S., 'Radicalisation & Preventative Measures: An Educational Handbook of Insider Threat Case Studies,' King's College London: Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS), 2018

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats, Nuclear Security Series: Implementing Guide, Vienna, No. 8., 2008