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Guard forces at nuclear facilities have a clear role in implementing nuclear security at their sites. Force members have primary responsibility for implementing physical protection systems (PPS) and deterring attacks, delaying and denying adversary goals by neutralising threats posed to the site, and aiding the recovery of material should an attack be successful.
However, not all threats will be directly physical or visible. As research from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission shows, an overt armed assault is ‘one of the least likely methods of attack’ as ‘even highly dedicated terrorists usually choose to approach their targets without resorting to arms, preferring to display firepower only once inside and in control of a facility’. According to the UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), five main types of insider activity were identified after analysing 120 different cases. These include ‘unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information; process corruption; facilitation of third party access to an organisation’s assets; physical sabotage; and electronic or IT sabotage’. According to the CPNI study, unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information (47%) and process corruption (42%) were the most frequent types of insider activity.
Other measures are therefore required to counter threats posed by other threat vectors, such as insiders or the cyber domain. Here, the first signs of an attack or potential vulnerability are likely to be observed by staff and those working in technical roles – rather than the guard force. For example, colleagues are best placed to notice differences in their co-workers’ behaviours or working patterns that may suggest ill-intent.
Staff members are also responsible for enforcing rules and procedures that minimise the risk of security incidents, such as auditing materials and processes, implementing two-man rules or clear desk policies. It has been increasingly recognised that for nuclear security to be effective, everyone within an organisation needs to be activity involved. This has been promoted through the concept of nuclear security culture.
The importance of organisational culture is emphasised in the IAEA’s guide on Nuclear Security Culture, which notes that a nuclear security regime includes a range of elements and activities: ‘legislation and regulation; intelligence gathering; assessment of the threat to radioactive material and associated locations and facilities; administrative systems; various technical hardware systems; response capabilities and mitigation activities’. The IAEA’s guide also makes the point that these items cannot be addressed in isolation: ‘an effective nuclear security culture is dependent on proper planning, training, awareness, operation and maintenance, as well as on people who plan, operate and maintain nuclear security systems’.
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